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FISHER, Circuit Judge.  
 Dionicio Gomez appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania imposing a 97-month sentence. For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and legal 
history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
 On May 1, 2005, Gomez was arrested for his involvement in the sale of one kilogram of 
cocaine to an undercover police officer.  Performing a valid search incident to arrest, an officer 
found a loaded Taurus 9mm handgun in Gomez’s right front pants pocket. On August 29, 2007, 
a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a three-count indictment charging 
Gomez with: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); distribution of 500 grams or more of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count Two); and possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(a) (Count Three). 
 Though the record does not make clear precisely when Gomez was released after his 
2005 arrest, Gomez was rearrested on December 13, 2007 following his indictment. On 
December 18, 2007, he was released on bail. As conditions of his pretrial release, Gomez was 
required to surrender his passport, restrict his travel to within the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and report to the United States Pretrial Services every Tuesday. Pretrial Services 
lost contact with Gomez after January 10, 2008. Because he violated the conditions of his pretrial 
release, the District Court executed a warrant for his arrest on January 17, 2008. 
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Though he surrendered his passport, Gomez was able to abscond to the Dominican 
Republic by obtaining a letter from the Dominican Consulate allowing him to leave the United 
States.  He did not inform the Consulate that he was out on pretrial release or that this travel had 
been restricted. On March 24, 2011, the United States Marshal Service arrested Gomez in the 
Dominican Republic and returned him to the United States to appear on the charges from the 
2007 indictment.  
Gomez elected to proceed to trial, and on February 10, 2012, a jury convicted him on 
Count One, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of 
cocaine, and Count Two, distribution of 500 or more grams of cocaine.  The jury acquitted on 
Count Three, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  
The District Court conducted a sentencing hearing on May 23, 2012.
1
  The Presentence 
Investigation Report assigned Gomez a base offense level of 26. It then added two levels for 
possession of a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and two levels for obstruction of 
justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Gomez had zero criminal history points, placing him in 
criminal history category I.  This resulted in an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 97 to 
121 months. The District Court imposed a sentence of 97 months. This timely appeal followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We “review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines 
for clear error and … exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the 
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Guidelines.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). We review the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence imposed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). 
III. 
Our review is for “reasonableness,” which the Supreme Court has crystallized into a two-
step inquiry: first, we inquire whether the District Court’s sentencing decision was procedurally 
sound; and second, we inquire whether it was substantively reasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  
Ensuring the proper calculation of the Guidelines range falls under the procedural prong. United 
States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). 
On appeal, Gomez argues that the District Court erred: (A) in applying a two-level 
enhancement for possession of a firearm; and (B) in applying a two-level enhancement for 
obstruction of justice. We disagree.  
A. 
 We first consider whether the District Court erred in applying a two-level enhancement 
for possession of a firearm, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).  
 Gomez argues that the District Court erred in applying this enhancement because he was 
acquitted of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  He 
contends that because he never brandished the firearm during the drug sale – or even made its 
presence known – the District Court erred in determining the firearm was used “in connection 
with” the offense. This argument is not persuasive. 
Factual findings related to the Guidelines must be supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and we will affirm the District Court’s factual findings unless they are clearly 
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erroneous. Grier, 475 F.3d at 561. Furthermore, conduct underlying a charge of which the 
defendant has been acquitted can “be considered at sentencing despite the acquittal, ‘so long as 
that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.’” United States v. Berry, 553 
F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 
157 (1997)). The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement “[i]f a dangerous 
weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The Guidelines further 
state that “[t]he enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly 
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11. Gomez was 
arrested immediately following a significant drug transaction, at which time the arresting officer 
found a loaded gun in his front pants pocket. Though Gomez contends that the firearm was 
legally purchased and that he had it for the purpose of his legitimate business, the Government 
“need only prove that the defendant possessed the weapon during the currency of the offense, not 
necessarily that he actually used it in perpetrating the crime or that he intended to do so.”  United 
States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1997).  Gomez concedes that the weapon was 
physically present, and he has not shown that it was clearly improbable that the gun was 
connected with the drug sale. Therefore, the District Court did not clearly err in finding that 
Gomez possessed the firearm in connection with the offense for purposes of the sentencing 
enhancement. 
B. 
 We next consider whether the District Court erred in applying a two-level enhancement 
for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  
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 Gomez argues that the District Court erred in applying this enhancement because his 
failure to abide by the bail conditions was not an attempt to avoid prosecution, but was instead 
grounded in familial and humanitarian reasons. He claims that he left the United States to care 
for his ailing father and grandfather, both of whom lived in the Dominican Republic and passed 
away in early 2008.  However, Gomez concedes that even after the death of his father and 
grandfather, he failed to voluntarily return to the United States. He contends that this was 
because he did not have the necessary documents to return, not because he was attempting to 
evade prosecution. This argument is not persuasive.  
Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines states: 
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, 
the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing 
of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstruction conduct was related to (A) the 
defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related 
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  Although simply avoiding or fleeing from arrest will not, ordinarily, trigger 
application of this adjustment, see id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5(D), “willfully failing to appear . . . for a 
judicial proceeding” will trigger it, see id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E).  
 Though Gomez proffers an alternative explanation for his avoidance of prosecution, the 
question before this Court is whether the District Court clearly erred in determining by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Gomez, by absconding to the Dominican Republic, willfully 
obstructed justice.  Our review of the record indicates that the District Court did not clearly err.  
Gomez was under indictment and was clearly aware that he had pending court dates and that his 
travel had been restricted as a condition of his pretrial release.  He failed to inform the 
Dominican Consulate of these restrictions, and he did not seek permission to travel. Moreover, 
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even after his father and grandfather passed away, Gomez continued to avoid prosecution for 
nearly three years until his arrest in 2011 by the United States Marshals Service. Gomez’s 
conduct falls well within the purview of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Therefore, the District Court did not 
clearly err by applying the enhancement for obstruction of justice.  
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s imposition of a 97-
month sentence.  
